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 Abstract
The question of resistance as a pleasurable activity continues to 
be a theme within cultural studies. This essay argues that the ideology 
of pleasurable resistance is precisely the way that capitalist patriarchy 
maintains its hegemony through seduction. By focusing mainly on 
the writings of John Fiske and his employment of Foucault´s power/
knowledge couplet and Barthe´s appropriation of jouissance, it is 
argued that the discursive subject position overlooks the value of the 
psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy identification. It is suggested 
that a more radical understanding of jouissance as developed within 
a psychoanalytic view of the split-subject needs to be addressed (or 
reinstated) into visual cultural studies research in order to take the 
seductive workings of fantasy into account. The essay ends with a call 
for a return to neo-Gramscian counter-hegemony through “popular 
visual education.” The difference between cultural studies and “visual” 
cultural studies is one of emphasis only. Throughout the essay the visual 
has been absorbed by the larger general category.
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  Like the alchemist´s philosopher’s stone, which was a substance 
that supposedly changed other metals into gold or silver, and like 
the fabulous diamond in the film Romancing the Stone which was to 
fulfill every possible fantasy, cultural studies has found its stone in the 
pleasures of “resistance.” In the consumerist markets of transnational 
capitalism the resisting subject clears the space of agency in what would 
otherwise be a Baudrillarian sutured “ecstasy of communication” 
whereby all possible meanings have already been precluded, including 
the message and the receiver. While the question of “resistance” has 
been a laudable goal in visual cultural studies, I wish to interrogate 
this concept, perhaps adding a little tarnish to the stone´s brilliance. 
My primarily argument is that this concept, as it is currently deployed 
in postmodernism, is over-romanticized in its suppositions (cf. Curran, 
1990; Schlesinger, 1991; McGuigan, 1992).   
 The “popularity” of resistance emerged during a time of neo-
conservatism of the mid-’80s when the transformations of the New 
Right—Reagan/Bush in the US., Mulroney in Canada, Thatcherism in 
Britain, Helmet Kohl in Germany—required a response by a Left which 
had lost its authorial agency. One response to this crisis of the Left was 
provided by the neo-Gramscian proposal for a radical democracy as 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The “new social movements” 
at that time (feminism, green politics, animal rights, identity politics) 
were to be politically “articulated” by way of a discursive organization 
in a chain of equivalences between different forms of oppressions and 
struggles to form a counter-hegemonic force that was to oppose the 
current power bloc. Such a horizon of opportunity presented itself 
at a time when these social movements already had “antagonistic” 
relationships with the state; its members required no “conscientization” 
(cf. Paulo Freire) to make them aware of the inequalities of power and 
oppression. The decade that followed the publication of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Hegemony & Social Change, however, saw the New Right make 
Romancing the Stone
continual gains in dispersing and recuperating these movements under 
the need for greater self-autonomy and less state control. A “culture of 
narcissism,” as Christopher Lash in 1978 argued, had fully emerged. 
The “war of position” had been lost, along with a troubling confirmation 
that class, race and gender as markers of stable identity, were no longer 
entirely adequate to theorize this change. 
 What arose simultaneously was the eventual supplantation 
of neo-Gramscian hegemonic struggles of “the people” with a social 
imaginary filled by Foucault´s power/knowledge couplet and de 
Certeau´s tactic/strategy games where “resistance” in both cases was 
coded as “good” because it was against the dominant ideology. The 
Left was characterized as avoiding the practicalities of everyday life, 
too concerned with the macro structures of society and expecting major 
social transformations which never came. These new social explanatory 
forms, supplemented by reception theories and ethnographic studies, 
which were more fluid in their applicability to capture the “morphing” 
conditions, seemed to answer the call of agency. However, the stress 
placed on the “pleasure” of resistance, as developed by one strand of 
cultural studies, has been particularly confusing in the wake of these 
post-Gramscian developments. It almost appears as if the pendulum has 
swung the other way. I refer to the difficulty of identifying resistances 
and struggles that are merely complicit  with the power bloc from those 
that are antagonistic to it. With the concept of “false consciousness” as 
an illusory representation of reality having lost ground amongst post-
Marxist circles, and with the theorization of Althusser making ideology 
fundamental to the human condition, the question of social progress 
remains “undecidable” unless a fuller democratic potential can be 
realized and “false consciousness” re-coded as still a useful concept. 
The valorization of “resistance” in cultural studies, with its subsequent 
flattening out of its qualities and forms, has overlooked the education 
of subjects opposed to the manifold and varied forms of power, which 
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was part of the Gramscian moral tradition of cultural studies in the first 
place. This has been replaced with a naive belief that consumers are 
more clever than was once thought. The stress on “resistant pleasures” 
has brought with it a tiresome and banal corollary: “the masses are not 
to be taken as cultural dopes” (cf. Morris, 1988). This essay explores 
the suspicion that this is precisely the subject-ideal that contemporary 
capitalism desires: subversive and de-stabilized identities who seek new 
modes of enjoyment through forms of romanticized resistances made 
possible by the “deterritorializations” of capitalism as exemplified by 
liberalist pluralist subject positions. 
 More specifically, the thesis entertained here is that the ideal 
subject of capitalist consumption is the exact inverse of the ideal subject 
of “real” socialism. In the socialist system, according to Havel (1985) 
and Salecl (1994: 48), the private citizen did not believe in the system; 
the regime was criticized privately but obeyed publicly. Capitalism is a 
system which is resisted publicly through democratic social actions, but 
obeyed privately in the belief this is the best that is possible. Socialist 
ideology functioned as long as the public rituals were obeyed. Capitalist 
patriarchal ideology maintains itself by constructing a symbolic space, 
which creates formations of fantasy whereby spectators are allowed to 
escape the traumas of everyday reality through forms of romanticized 
resistance. Capitalism’s staging of “the fantasy of resistance” through 
commodity culture provides the satisfaction that the subject’s own 
ideal ego has been achieved by exercising agency and free choice. The 
argument to be developed here is that many of the examples that are 
said to offer popular resistances of pleasure. Shopping, music and 
computer videos, fashion, game and quiz shows, soap operas, the 
science fiction genre and reality television are the constitutive forms of 
capitalist ideology, while “resistance” is the very surplus that comes 
with consuming enjoyment. “Resistance” to these forms is the very 
“symptom” of contemporary capitalism. Following Zizek (1989: 21), 
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I want to suggest that this consumer “enjoyment” (jouissance) which 
makes the participation in these forms possible, already includes the 
“tactics” of resistant self-reflexivity. It adds to their enjoyment, which 
is what I mean by romantic resistance being a “surplus.” In other 
words, the ideological “being” of the ideal capitalist subject is offered 
a fantasy structure whereby resistance is symptomatic of the very logic 
of late capitalism. How else to account for the apparently obvious 
premise that the most successful popular cultural forms are the ones 
that are most financially successful because they reach such wide and 
diverse audiences? Hegemony operates precisely through popularity 
that is enhanced by the polysemic nature of a text (Lewis, 1991). Both 
complicity and contradiction are “factored” into the “bloc buster” texts 
(films, music and computer videos, books) including the academic 
market as well. As Ronald Jones sarcastically remarked, “Spending time 
devising the next confrontational culture is how the culture industry 
organizes the time of the intelligentsia” (in Hewison, 1990: 9).
 In the preface to their second edition of Escape Attempts (1992/1976), 
Cohen and Taylor confirm the cynicism of “resistant” postmodernism: 
“twenty years ago we were fascinated by the ingenious and desperate 
ways in which people tried to ignore, subvert or resist paramount 
[dominant] reality. Now, we would have to start with the ways in which 
paramount reality ignores, subverts and resists itself all the time. At 
the same time there has been a spreading out, a popularization. The 
tricks, routes and programmes of the elite have become better known 
(if not actually available) to all ...” (16-17, my emphasis). Films like 
Robert Altman´s The Player or Roland Emmerich´s Independence Day, 
for example, self-consciously “wink” at their audiences, letting them 
know that what they are watching is simply exaggerated artifice. Said 
differently: “the emperor is naked and the media trumpet forth this 
fact, yet nobody seems really to mind—that is, people continue to act 
as if the emperor is not naked ... “ (Zizek, 1994:18).    
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 Resistance as symptom is a paradoxical element within 
capitalism. Peter Sloterdijk (1987/1983) names it “cynical reason.” 
Cynical reason describes the ideal capitalist subject: resisting on the 
outside but still believing on the inside. Zizek (1989:29) rephrases Marx’s 
“false consciousness” of “they do not know it, but they are doing it,” 
into its contemporary postmodernist reality: “they know very well 
what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.” Romanticized forms 
of resistance exhibit this form of “enlightened false consciousness.” 
Even when one knows the particular hidden interests at work in the 
various capitalist forms of consumerism, they are not renounced, rather 
the pleasure is found in enjoying and believing in the subversions that 
their fantasy formations allow. As Cohen and Taylor (1992/1976) argued 
some time ago, following Erwing Goffman´s lead of “role-distance,” 
mockery, irony, and skepticism as forms of self-consciousness of the 
social predicament provide “escape attempts” to protect oneself from 
the fear that one’s behavior is determined by the rules of the cultural 
setting.  “It did not mean however that they now acted against the 
institution, it more usually meant that they went along with its edicts 
with an easier heart, reassured by the distance which they could 
mentally maintain from its social arrangements” (56). Such behavior, 
as Zizek remarks, is different from Sloterdijk´s term kynicism inspired 
by Diogenes which represents popular plebian rejections of the official 
culture by means of irony and sarcasm (see Scott, 1985). The forms of 
popular culture discussed here do not fall into this category which are 
informed by a fundamental “antagonism.” On the contrary, in an act 
of “romanticized resistance,” as for instance when women of lower 
socio-economic standing are “liberated” by replacing “masculine money 
with feminine knowledge” by playing The New Price is Right  (Fiske, 
1990: 137), an ideological fantasy or unconscious illusion structures 
their social reality, and their desires to fill their lack. In this case, 
this unconscious fantasy is a liberal patriarchal one: the imaginary 
metaphorical displacement of working class women and housewives to 
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be like their husbands by having equal economic power; an aspiration 
which is a denial of the actual existent conditions. Their enjoyment 
(jouissance) masks the trauma of their inability to achieve and occupy 
this subject position given their present material conditions. As Zizek 
(1989) argues, “the place of illusion is in the reality of doing itself” (33). 
Under this formulation, Fiske´s ‘art of making do” becomes “they know 
that, in their activity [e.g., playing the quiz show] they are following 
an illusion, but still they are doing it” (ibid., my italic).  
“Power, Power Everywhere, 
but not a Drop of Freedom !” 
 
 Fiske (1991) has strongly addressed Baudrillard´s characterization 
of popular culture and television in a postmodern age, arguing that his 
theory of postmodernism is largely stuck at the level of macro-structure 
and misses the concrete, contextualized practices where the socially 
produced images and socially positioned subjects intersect. The play 
of signs, the refusal of genre categorizations, and the pastiche style of 
postmodern sensibility belong largely to the middle- and upper-classes 
who can afford to play such “dress up” games. For the lives of the 
subordinated the story is quite different. In Power Plays; Power Works 
(1993) Fiske puts into play the figure of a group of “homeless” men 
watching Die Hard within the confines of their shelter’s VCR system. 
One of the men gets up and abruptly turn the video off when Bruce 
Willis, the film’s protagonist eventually begins to side with police 
authority. Fiske refers to this incident several times throughout his 
book as a way of demonstrating the conflicts of power that surround 
any media reception. He argues that this incident demonstrates the 
agency of resistance despite the fact that these men occupy one of the 
most powerless and helpless subject positions in society. 
 Another often cited demonstration of active agency comes from 
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“critical” (post-Marxist) educational theories of Michael Apple (1979; 
1982), Henry Giroux (1981), and Paul Willis (1981). To avoid the charge 
of Marxist structuralism which characterized their writings in the early 
’80s, they (much like the “late” Foucault of The History of Sexuality) 
turned their attention to “resistance theories” (e.g., Giroux, 1983). This 
trajectory easily drifted toward questions of “self-identity” which began 
to play on the academic hit-parade. The “hidden curriculum,” as the 
unintentional curriculum that emerged “behind the backs” of both 
students and teacher, was theorized by the complexities and ephemeral 
nature of Foucault´s knowledge/power dynamics. A particular good 
early example comes from the semiotic theory of television viewing 
developed by Hodge and Tripp (1986:183-187). They give the example 
of the Australian soap opera Prisoner, whereby school aged children 
(11-13) identified with its story line set in a women’s prison by 
perceiving themselves as prisoners of the school system, subject to 
similar punishments, experiencing the same hierarchy between “them 
and us,” and identifying their teachers as its wardens. Arguably such 
an interpretation could well change as they grow older and become 
parents and teachers themselves. Hodge and Tripp dealt only with the 
general consensus of the school children as to the soap’s popularity. 
Gender differences were not explored, nor were those children who 
disliked the soap questioned for their contradictory readings. Further 
research, if desired, could identify the economy of other existing power 
inequalities. Their study, however, made it obvious that such “resistant” 
meanings attributed to images were inseparable from the material social 
conditions of those who produced them. 
 The study by Hodge and Tripp, and Fiske´s suggestive 
“homeless” example demonstrate how the micro and macro come 
together in resistance according to Foucault´s theory of power. The 
inequalities of both the institution of education and the state can be 
teased out by theorizing everyday life.  As Fiske argues, the construction 
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of “meanings” as part of a set of social and power relations is never static 
but fluid; it is the site/sight/cite of constant contestation and struggle. 
But is this, in itself, a limiting proposition? The multiplicity of the axes 
of social difference, i.e., sex, gender, class, race, ethnicity, ableism, 
age, are continually evolving into new kaleidoscopic arrangements. 
Power, as Foucault had conceptualized it and Fiske had appropriated 
it, is forever enigmatic. It does not possess us, but rather it invests and 
turns us into an element in the play of multiple forces, which seem to 
have no specific point of origin. In McGowan (1991) summative words: 
“it [power] is productive; it is only exercised by individuals but never 
possessed by them [i.e., the individual is constituted by power]; and 
it is involved in every social relation” (127). In this formulation “the 
individual exercises power at certain times and in certain places as 
a functionary of power’s intentions, not her own” (ibid.). Foucault 
explicitly supports the rationality of power as “characterized by 
tactics that are often quit explicit at the restricted level where they are 
inscribed (the local cynicism of power)...” (Foucault, 1980: 95). In other 
words, Foucault´s view of power constitutes the cynical individual of 
postmodernism.1  Resistance is always theorized against the position of 
dominant power which, in turn, forms Fiske’s definition of “popular 
culture.” “[T]here can be no popular dominant culture, for popular 
culture is formed always in reaction to, and never as part of, the forces 
of domination” (1989:43). 
Split Subject of Psychoanalysis versus the 
Poststructuralist Discursive Subject
Foucault dismissed the “split-subject” of psychoanalysis; i.e., the 
dualistic vision that pits an inhibiting power against an autonomous 
and oppressed subject (Copjec, 1990:13-15; Salecl, 1994: 95). Instead, 
his positive concept of power conceives resistance as emerging from the 
113jagodzinski
process that installs the subject (the body) into the social. Law is a norm 
based on power. There is no power without the potential of refusal or 
revolt (resistance). Intersubectivity, what Dews (1987:198) calls “the 
reciprocity specific to the social domain,” is by and large, diminished 
in Foucault´s thought. Psychoanalysis in contrast, conceptualizes the 
negative force of power in the sense of rejecting one’s own desires. 
Power is a force of exclusion or repression. In the theoretical stance 
of Fiske, fantasy as the seat of ideology drops out. Resistance cannot 
be theorized along the lines of fantasy formations; rather it becomes 
a reactive formation against power structures.2  The homeless men, 
for instance, sided with the weak against the strong. “By erasing the 
end of the movie, when the normal [power relations] reasserted itself, 
they made sense of the temporary victories of the weak as if they were 
permanent” (Fiske, 1993:129, original italic). The “as if,” which is the 
seat of ideology, is under theorized. These homeless men exhibit the 
cynical attitude referred to earlier. There is resistance all right, but 
the subsequent “freedom” is rather empty since no action to achieve 
particular purposes has taken place (cf. McGowan, 1991:130). The 
strength of informing this account with the fantasy structures that 
support the homeless men’s sense of maintaining their “as if” structures, 
in short their “reality,” would move the question of “resistance” onto a 
whole other level. Fiske (1993) does develop the sociological grounds 
as to why the spectacle of violence is enjoyed by men in a patriarchal 
capitalist society (Chapter 6). Only by dissolving the fantasy structures 
that support the viewing of spectaclular violence would it become 
possible for these homeless men to redirect their energies into other, 
more active forms of resistance, perhaps organizing themselves into a 
collective. “The subject can ‘enjoy his symptom’ only in so far as its logic 
escapes him—the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely 
its dissolution” (Zizek, 1989:21). In brief, unconscious knowledge is 
what structures their fantasies.
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 The difficulty with theorizing resistance along Foucault’s 
trajectory is that it lends itself to an analysis of micro-politics based 
on place or location. Foucault´s rhetoric of its complexity leaves an 
unbridgeable gap between these micro-procedures of power and 
any formulation of its centralization.3  The “disciplinary procedures” 
that operate at the level of “micro-power” seem to by-pass ideology 
altogether since they are not made accountable to some knowable or 
unknowable external power or organizing principal.4  Fiske (1993:34, n.9), 
for example, utilizes the concepts station and locale as developed by 
Bourdieu´s concept of habitus and Gidden´s notion of locale  to develop 
his “power plays, power works” thesis. The question, however, now 
becomes whether the sense of place (“locale,” “habitus,” “station”) 
is still conceptually adequate to theorize power in a postmodern 
electronic world? Is this not also a romantic holdover? As Best and 
Kellner (1991:23) point out, Foucault´s wide-ranging analyses of power 
omitted “any discussion of the key contemporary mechanisms of 
power and social reproduction: media, consumption, fashion, leisure, 
and semiotics.” If Meyrowitz´s (1985) thesis of “no sense of place” is to 
be accepted, the electronic media such as television and the computer 
have undermined the traditional relationship between physical setting 
and social situation. Space (cf. Harvey, 1989) and not place, is where 
such theories concerning power should take place. In Forget Foucault 
(1987/1977) Baudrillard argued that power as Foucault had theorized 
it was obsolete in an age of simulacra determined by models, codes, 
information, and the media. Power had become abstract, unlocatable 
in either the micro or macro structures. In The Electronic Disturbance 
(1994), members of the radical left Critical Art Ensemble conceptualize 
power as absent and invisible. In an electronic age they argue, it is a 
cyber-elite—postmodern Scythians—who possess “nomadic power” in 
their ability to compress time and space at will by occupying the power 
of the decentralized and deterritorialized cyberspace. Electronic space 
controls the physical logistics of manufacture. “In most cases sedentary 
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populations submit to the obscenity of spectacle, and contentedly pay 
the tribute demanded, in the form of labor material, and profit” (16). 
In sci-fi dystopias like Fortress, Blade Runner, and Total Recall even 
the memories and fantasies have been artificially implanted by a 
corporate cyber-elite colonizing the last vestiges of proletarian private 
resistance. 
 How can “sedentary servants,” in Critical Art Ensemble terms, 
cause a “disturbance,” under such nomadic domination? What can 
“paramount” or “dominant” reality mean in a hyperreal world? Where 
is the Gramscian “power bloc” located if power is so decentralized? 
What are you resisting when you cannot locate in any adequate way, 
except perhaps from feelings of melancholia and apocalyptic doom 
what it is that is oppressing you? (Jay, 1994:35) Such questions raise the 
possibility that the “multiple,” fluid or morphing subjectivity is exactly 
what late capitalism needs. On one level, it allows a moneyed class to 
be mobile, fluid, and nomadic like the cyber-elite themselves. “Multiple 
selves” can enhance the multiple effects of pleasure through even more 
consumption. Here the mantra of modernist categories of class, color, 
ethnicity, gender, ages and so on as critical categories no longer hold. If 
they do, they can become counter-productive for profit as in “color” 
and “green” capitalism. Post-fordist capitalism treats them as designer 
categories. Any combination of these signs produces a specific target 
population. As Mercer (1990:426) has argued, this radical pluralism has 
resulted in “the challenge of sameness” where “no one has a monopoly on 
oppositional identity.” (emphasis in original)  The sign of being /black/ 
for instance, is dispersed over a wide discursive field. Patricia Williams 
(1991), a lawyer from Harvard deconstructs her experience of being 
barred from Benetton because she was /black/, but here her color 
was profitably misread and overdetermined by the clerk who refused 
her entrance. The racial signifier /black/, under other circumstances, 
identified members of an underclass that did not have the money to 
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shop there which she did. Her fluidly blocked—which under other 
circumstances would have never happened—Williams’s anger was 
chandelled in exposing Benetton’s racist practices.5  Clothing companies 
such as Cross-colors and Mondetta have already recognized the counter-
profitability of maintaining exclusive categories, as has the fashion 
industry that is profiting from cross-dressing and “designing women” 
(cf. Gaines and Herzog, 1990). Perpetual cultural deconstruction of 
meanings and identities as excesses of desire propels consumerist 
capitalism. In this respect, Madonna’s continued proliferating identities 
makes her The material girl par excellence.x
 On another level, capitalist marketing targets specific life-styles 
as so many fractal spaces whose descriptive composite is generated 
by a computerized profile made possible by the “electronic body” 
each of us already has, registered through bank accounts, consensus 
questionnaires, social insurance numbers, income tax returns, credit 
ratings, organizations to which we belong, and so on. Although as 
agents with “free will,” we do not have to empirically identify with 
these discursive “market segmented” subject positions prepared for us 
by capitalist engineers, the very fact that post-fordist designer capitalism 
reproduces itself through such a broad range of consumerist interests 
testifies to the success and profit that the pluralization of difference 
brings. Chaos theory,6  which has to deal with indeterminacy and 
uncertainty through stochastic statistical analysis, is precisely the very 
ideology necessary to manage transnational capitalism which has to 
configure (factor in) this plurality of differences. The proliferation of 
cable and satellite channels which will meet the whims of every possible 
interest group provides the alibi of liberal pluralism that differences are 
being served, and that the “end of ideology” and the “end of history” 
is indeed here despite critical analysis from the Left to claim otherwise. 
What can “resistance” possibly mean under these circumstances?
117jagodzinski
 In Seduction (1990/1979:8), the book that immediately followed 
Forget Foucault, Baudrillard makes the following suggestive remark: 
“that seduction represents mastery over the symbolic universe, while power 
represents only mastery of the real universe” (original italic). With seduction 
we enter into the Imaginary and the “reality” of fantasy, what might 
more adequately described as the contemporary cyber-space of the 
mind, where “the sublime object(s) of ideology” (Zizek, 1989) are to 
be found; where the really “real,” or virtual real is simulated fantasy. 
Hegemony and seduction occupy the same territory (Miller, 1990). As 
Cora Kaplan (1986:162) adds, “the reader identifies ... most of all with 
the process of seduction” (my emphasis). The interrogation of psychic 
investments which go into fantasy provide a way to go beyond the 
“cultural populism” (cf. McGuigan, 1992) of resistance. To theorize 
how readers/viewers of images and films are caught up in these webs 
of power requires the supposition of fantasy. However, reading/
viewing cannot, in and of itself, be radically individualized and any 
generalizations that have been attempted by psychoanalysis and 
textual analysis have led to a stalemate. In other words, taken to their 
radical extremes, psychoanalysis which “theoretically” deals with 
an N=1 results in a specificity which cannot be generalizable, while 
ethnographic approaches which use sociological variables (social class, 
gender, age and so on) as pre-given categories often end up in reductive 
generalizations and conflictual findings. As  Rodowick, who might be 
counted as one of the early few psychoanalytic theoreticians questioning 
any direct correspondence between desire and a sex/gendered subject 
position, has this to say:  
Despite the achievements of psychoanalytic film theory and 
textual analysis in the past twenty years, I would insist that all 
claims made about processes of identification in actual spectators, 
powerful and important as they may be, are speculative. In my view 
the analysis of forms of enunciation, or point of view, in fiction 
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films may tell us a great deal about ideological representations 
of gender differences. However, they can tell us nothing definitive 
about the forms of sexual identification, or the potential meanings, 
produced with respect to actual spectators. 
(Rodowick, 1991:viii, my emphasis). 
Walkerdine (1986;1993) is perhaps one of the few researchers 
who has tried to bridge this psychoanalytic-sociological divide in 
cultural studies by attempting to provide an explanation for the role 
which certain fantasies play in specific family situations through a self-
reflective and cautious ethnographic approach. Her research suggests 
that the available fantasy formations, which are consumed, are crucial 
to understanding resistance as a “romantic” ideological form.7  
 Our sense of self-identification to various socially created 
subject positions cannot be denied; feral children aside, no one escapes 
socialization. But we are dispersed subjects, overdetermined by some 
positions and not others. In Laclau and Mouffe´s (1985:111) turn of 
phrase, “This field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed, is the field 
of overdetermination” (original italic). The paradox of overdetermination 
means that self-identification is “articulated” by a particular element 
which otherwise remains as a subordinated part to self-identity as a 
closed “whole” system, i.e., our sense of ourselves as moi, as a self-
assured ego. As we have seen with the example of /black/, as a “free 
floating signifier” (Laclau, 1977) in particular context like the Benetton 
store, the identity of Patricia Williams was overdetermined by it, 
whereas in another context her position as a Harvard lawyer has more 
determining power. As dispersed subjects each of us is subjected to a 
variety of discourses differently. The riddle of postmodern political 
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subjectivity comes to mind: What do a trade unionist, a racist, a 
Christian, a wife-beater, and a consumer have in common? Answer: 
They all can be the same person! (Ross, 1990). Fiske makes no mention who 
it was amongst the homeless who turned off the film. Did he represent 
the wishes of all these men? Did he hold a place of privilege because he 
was a leader? Did that leadership come about because of his rhetorical 
power? or due to his physical strength? Was their fantasy of resistance 
merely a cynical repetition? 
 Can it be that Baudrillard´s “ecstasy of communication” 
is closer to describing the way ideology works if contradictory 
readings are equally accounted for? After all, the Hodge and Tripp 
example confirms the structural similarities of power in all modernist 
institutions: schools, asylums, police departments, corporations, 
hospitals, religious organizations which continue to function despite 
their inherent contradictions. Accommodation and complicity is as much 
of this reproductive process as is resistance. These are all examples 
of “total institutions” (Goffman, 1961) which have built in structural 
forms of power along with built-in safety features for their criticism. 
They are like Bakhtin´s “loophole” texts, anticipating the objections and 
faults to their very structure. The difficulty of attributing specificity to 
the media/reader couplet prompts me to ask whether the continued 
vogue in popular cultural studies isn’t inadvertently supporting 
a fantasy structure of resistance which is the very mechanism that 
allows patriarchal hegemony to reproduce itself through consumerist 
seductions? As Todd Gitlin (1991:336) once asked, “does it engage in 
the politics in the strictest sense ... or does it simply make the most of 
consumption?” 
Questioning Jouissance: “Enjoy Your Symptom More 
than Yourself”8  
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Gitlin’s question is a difficult one to answer. In one sense, 
subversive resistance provides great pleasure as developed in the 
well-known and (by now) well-worn thesis by de Certeau (1984), 
where the subordinate’s uses of “tact” prevail over the dominant’s 
“strategies” of containment. The same may be said of Fiske (1987; 1989 
a, b; 1990; 1992) and Stam (1989) in their interpretations of television 
series, game shows and films respectively with their appropriation 
of Bakhtin´s notion of carnivalesque opposition. Stam (1989:197) has 
eloquently analyzed Woody Allen’s Stardust Memories as brilliantly 
displaying Bakhtin’s notion of a “loophole text,” a filmic text which 
anticipates, in advance, all possible criticisms of itself and its director. 
Yet, despite this, the journalistic reviews charged the film with the very 
faults that it had already charged itself. For me, this indicates that the 
effects of the text far exceed the inner workings of its form, no matter 
how clever that form may prove to be. Stam enthusiastically embraces 
the resistant practices of the carnival, and yet I would temper his 
enthusiastic assessment of the subversive potential of the “cinematic” 
carnival with Umberto Eco’s more sobering assessment of the carnival 
as “an authorized transgression deeply dependent on a law that it only 
apparently violates ... [T]he powerful have always used the circenses 
to muffle popular rebellion, just as the contemporary mass media, 
instruments of social control, operate a ‘continuous carnivalization of 
life’ “ (in Stam, 1989:91). 
   In cultural studies, perhaps Janice Radway (1984) has been 
given the most quotable credit in recent years for introducing this 
resistant view in her ethnographis study of women reading romance 
novels who identify with a particular feisty heroine who fights against 
her domineering male antagonist. Fiske´s encapsulation of resistance 
as the “art of making do” with what’s at hand, and the political use 
of pleasure by women in popular culture, especially in women’s 
genres of soap operas, romance novels, melodramas, the fashion 
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industry, shopping for pleasure, and popular music require cautious 
assessment. Their locations, by and large, are shaped by institutions 
already “structured in dominance” (Hall, 1980: 134). This is an extremely 
difficult issue to think through since all texts are constituted by aspects 
of utopia and ideology (Jameson, 1981). Fiske constantly reminds his 
readers that the potentiality of disruption, subversion and liberalization 
always exists in the bodily excesses of jouissance; i.e., in carnivalesque 
pleasures where bodies escape being managed and disciplined by 
the social order. Despite such assurances, I believe it is still a highly 
contentious proposition to underestimate the license given by the 
prevailing social order to allow such forms to exist as a “strategy of 
containment” (Eagleton, 1981). Without such allowances the discursive 
rhetoric of “democracy” as the best that can be currently achieved 
could never be maintained. Jouissance is itself, under-theorized and 
a problematic concept. French feminists (Cixcous, Irigaray, Clément, 
Montrelay) wrestled the term away from Lacan precisely because 
Lacan admitted that feminine jouissance in particular existed outside 
the containment of the Symbolic Order. As the Symbolic Order´s limit, 
they found the excesses of jouissance as a liberation from phallocentrism. 
Writing around the same time, Barthes´ (1975) appropriation of the 
Lacanian term as developed in his “pleasure of the text” thesis, gave 
him leverage to break with orthodox notions of ideology critique. This 
fit neatly into Fiske´s further reappropriation of the term into popular 
culture as a form of resistant bodily evasion.9  However, because Fiske 
rejects the “split-subject” of psychoanalysis, theorizing Foucault’s 
discursive subject instead, his interpretation of jouissance fails to 
recognize that resistance coupled to jouissance as he interprets this term 
is the seat of ideology par excellent. From a Lacanian psychoanalytic view 
enjoyment, as jouis-sense (“enjoy-meant,” or “enjoyment-in-meaning”), 
means a mis-recognition of the very “substance,” or “kernel” of one’s 
desire which remains hidden and unknowable. In contrast, Fiske’s 
interpretation of jouissance is comparable to plaisir in Roland Barthes 
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sense—mundane pleasure that confirms one sense of identity. Under 
these circumstances, resistance as pleasurable meaning means avoiding 
the Real (unconscious) of one’s desire. Access to such knowledge 
would  mean paying for it with a loss of enjoyment. The stupidity of 
enjoyment as “resistance” is only possible on the basis of ignorance, 
or unconscious non-knowledge.1 0 Facing the “kernel” of one’s desire 
is a terrifying and fearful event, one where “freedom” means breaking 
the symbolic reality in which one is embedded. Here jouissance takes 
on quite a different meaning. In  Zizek’s qualifying phrase:
What should be pointed out here is that enjoyment (jouissance, 
Genuss) is not to be equated with pleasure (Lust): enjoyment if 
precisely ‘Lust im Unlust’; it designates the paradoxical situation 
procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the 
equilibrium of the ‘pleasure principle.’ In other words, enjoyment 
is located ‘beyond the pleasure principle.’ 
(Zizek, 1993:280, n.6) 
 Fiske’s employment of Barthe’s term jouissance throughout his 
writings is more closely related to the pleasure principle of plaisir, and to 
the more familiar experience of catharsis than it is to the psychoanalytic 
realm of jouissance as defined above. I believe a case can be made for 
equating “resistance” as a postmodern form of catharsis. Catharsis has 
the same elements of jouissance as Fiske uses the term, namely as a “loss 
of subjectivity” that seems to escape the control of culture. Doesn’t the 
cathartic purging of fear and pity, which characterizes the classical 
sense of tragedy, fall under plaisir, as pleasure contained within the 
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social order? In the famous Lacanian (1982) seminar on the “ecstasy 
of St Teresa,” is her jouissance to be read as still under the recuperation 
of the Church’s power (after all, she is in ecstasy with God)? Or, is 
she now experiencing the delight of her own body, orgasmically and 
metaphorically represented by Irigaray´s (1985) “two lips”? How radical 
has her escape from the Church Father’s been? (see Ash, 1990)  
 Linda Williams (1991) has further complicated the issue of 
jouissance. Again, her discussion presents the possibility of naming 
resistance as a cathartic experience of containment. She has cleverly 
pointed to other filmic bodies in excess—in ecstasy —as they relate to 
specific film genres which have low cultural status, but a high repetition 
of consumption: overwhelming pathos in the “weepy” melodramas, the 
orgasmic body in pornographic films, and the violence and terror of the 
body in horror films. All three forms, which relate to sex, violence, and 
strong emotion, would fit Fiske´s “Barthian” definition of jouissance as 
a primal orgasmic experience of fantasy (see note 12). “Visually, each of 
these ecstatic excesses could be said to share a quality of uncontrollable 
convulsion or spasm —of the body ‘beside itself’ with sexual pleasure, 
fear and terror, or overpowering sadness” (Williams: 1991:4). These 
primary embodiments of pleasure, fear, and pain, which range from 
the masculine pole (pornography) to the feminine pole (melodrama), 
with horror in between for adolescents “careening wildly between 
the two masculine and feminine poles,” (ibid.) are played out over 
the bodies of women in extremely complex ways. If Williams is to be 
followed, pleasure becomes an extremely complicated issue as the 
cinematic gaze bounces all over the sex/gender landscape with no 
easy way of separating the boundaries between pleasure, fear and 
pain. Often pleasure turns to pain and visa versa as in the practices of 
sadomasochism. For a teenager, fear can be a pleasurable experience 
while watching a horror film (Glover, 1992). 
We have now reached a point where sex/gender confusions 
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abound in terms of subject positions which any one text offers (Adams, 
1991; Rodowick, 1991). Evasive pleasures may be found in the new 
genres of pornography developed specifically for women, heterosexual 
couples, bisexuals, gays, lesbians, as well as for the transgendered 
community. The recent phenomenon of male “weepies,” melodramas 
like Dad have appeared. Is it possible to interpret these bodies in excess 
which are allowed to let off “bodily steam,” so to speak; to ejaculate, 
shudder, spill blood, sob and cry as a way to avoid the “normal” 
and banal disciplined existence of mundane life as a containment 
strategy by dominant hegemony? We are back full circle to the 
question of catharsis. The difference being that such societal catharsis 
is not classically defined as tragic—purging fear and pity—but its 
postmodern varieties which purge yet other anxieties of the age: the 
insecurities related to sex/gender and power.  Isn’t the border between 
Barthes´ weak dichotomization between plaisir/jouissance represented 
by the very institutionalized forms of cathartic release: Greek tragedy, 
Roman gladiatorial fights, Medieval public executions, and today’s 
postmodernist spectatorial forms of audience participation, like 
telethons, live aid, sports spectaculars and rock concerts? With the loss 
of authority and faith and trust in the Symbolic Order, the question of 
perverted jouissance once more emerges on the landscape. What role 
does hysterical and obsessional behavior as it relates to the Law have 
for young people today? How can be identify desire which is potentially 
transformative from the drive impulses that are more destructive? 
Euphoric “hooliganism” that young men experience during soccer 
matches, or the “slam” dances of skinhead culture, or the drug-induced 
euphoria of rave dances, strictly speaking as resistant displays of 
jouissance surely are not to be interpreted positively. Rather, they are 
symptomatic of the psychic pain that young people suffer today, where 
“skin games” (piercing, tattooing and cutting) have radical ways to 
“feel” (jagodzinski, in press).
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 There is no radical psychology of desire incorporated into 
cultural studies, at least to my knowledge, which would help theorize 
how the identification in fantasy with a heroine by a “housewife” who 
regularly consumes specific novels Janice Radway describes, leads 
to actually changes in the real conditions of her existence. Her experience 
of jouissance (as plaisir), and the cathartic release that comes with it 
may simply be one of emotional release, a way to sustain a hope that 
her future will change. These are accommodations to the structure, 
rather than challenges to its limits. It may well be that this form of 
empowerment provides her with more space by challenging some 
of her husband’s patriarchal practices. But should such resistance be 
interpreted as liberating? Concessions to some of her demands on her 
husband’s part may well be made in order to maintain a relationship of 
subordination. Put pejoratively speaking, if the “natives” are restless, 
then yield to some of their demands; give then some “rope” so that 
their “work” can go on. Isn’t this precisely what this melodrama does? 
As Schröder concludes in his discussion of Dynasty: 
In other words, TV melodrama establishes an aesthetic contract 
with its viewers. It offers them an opportunity to explore individual 
and social tensions and to face behaviour which is shocking or 
threatening to prevailing moral codes. Furthermore, it promises 
that the experience will end on a note of reassurance and moral 
acceptability, and be stranded with frequent implausibilities so 
that viewers can suspend involvement and withdraw to a position 
of superior distance, should they begin to feel uncomfortably 
affected by the fictional distance of agony and immorality 
(Schröder:1988:76). 
After the viewing of each episode of Dynasty, after the reading of every 
romance novel, the social structure remain essentially the same. It would 
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have to take a lot more than just reading such romance novels for a 
woman to get away from the reality of an abusive relationship.  
 In the mid-90s, Ien Ang (1996:91) reaffirmed that Sue Ellen 
character in Dallas was by far the most popular character with whom 
women identify with. As a heroine, she represents the very embodiment 
of the melodramatic imagination—masochistic and powerless—a 
surrender to forces outside the subject. As a symbolic realization of a 
popular feminine subject position this alone should continue to send 
out the message that feminist struggles are far from over. Yet, there is 
persistence that “reading the romance” is a resistant form that should 
continue to be honored. Ien Ang (1996:107), when reviewing Radway’s 
pioneering work, claims that the psychic investment in the romance 
fantasy should be taken seriously. “And it [the romantic fantasy] is 
this enduring emotional quest that, I would suggest, should be taken 
seriously as a psychical strategy by which women empower themselves 
in everyday life, leaving apart what its ideological consequences in 
social reality are” (emphasis mine). Ang is uncertain how feminism 
should respond to this, but she has no difficulty in chastising Radway 
for her rationalist feminist proposal to overcome the ideological function 
of the pleasure these women experience. Recognizing the psychic 
investment in the romantic fantasy is not the problem here. Rather it is 
the very pleasure these women experience as a form of “resistance” and 
“empowerment” which is precisely how they avoid the Real of their 
desire. They enjoy their “symptom” (i.e., being powerless and caught 
in a masochistic relationship) more than themselves. The “repetition” 
of the romance fantasy is sustained by maintaining that the external 
circumstances they find themselves in cannot be changed—the psychic 
investment to make such a change is not worth it. It would cause 
too much “suffering.” Children and financial circumstances seem to 
make it “impossible.” Rather than facing the “freedom” that comes 
with jouissance in the psychoanalytic sense, they absolve themselves 
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of agency and displace it on external circumstances. As a further 
complication, if these women feel guilty and morally responsible for the 
state of their marriage, then there is no need to examine the ideological, 
political, and economic conditions of patriarchy that sustains their 
unhappiness, depression, and frustration. Reading the romance is a 
way of making the present oppressive circumstances tolerable. Such 
pleasures (e.g., like Sue Ellen’s occasional extra-marital affairs) often 
prevent them from falling into a completely cynical position which 
comes by completely blaming external circumstances. Instead they 
remain “good” housewives rather than falling into total rudeness 
and hate toward their husbands. Such a form of resistant agency acts 
like a “crutch,” keeping hope alive that  circumstances may change. 
In Derrida’s (1987) sense, where the frame itself is part of the framed 
content, the romance fantasy is the frame that frames these women into 
patriarchal ideology. It is the supplement which must be continually 
consumed in order to keep the picture tolerable. And that picture calls 
for an immobility regardless how strong the heroines are. 
 Looking now into the new millennium, a decade later, have 
things significantly changed since the mid-90s? Can we say that 
postfeminism of the liberal variety, exemplified by such television 
series as Sex in the City and the reality shows that have begun to pervert 
marriage (Joe Millionaire, The Bachelor, The Bachelorette, Meet My 
Parents, Married By America) have significantly altered the complaint? 
Admittedly, liberal feminism has introduced a “revolution” in the 
romance novel. It may be said that today’s postmodern heroine has 
been transformed into playing a “stronger role.” She has been given 
the strength of character to challenge her male antagonists. The same 
may be said for heterosexual and lesbian detective novels. No one 
would deny that the reading of such romance and detective novels 
may potentially contribute to a housewife’s eventual departure from 
an intolerable situation, or that lesbian detective stories don’t provide 
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positive fantasy models for women who are questioning their own sex 
preferences, or searching for confirmation regarding their own life 
styles. But, an answer which speaks to the reasons for change confined 
to the influence of media alone is undedcidable. Much like there is no 
causal link between watching video violence and committing real acts of 
brutality, a finding which is often repeated by media researchers even in 
controversial areas like pornography and televised and filmic violence, 
but continuously rejected by the pro-censorship moral guardians of 
society, the benefits of romance novels to women have been over-
exaggerated (Clancy, 1992; Purdie, 1992). Surely the social relations 
and the material conditions of the support communities which circle 
and contextualize the reading of romance are much more influential 
in determining the direction women’s lives will take? 
 It is often forgotten that such liberalist melodramatic romance 
forms have contributed to the gains of very small strata of white middle-
class women. Issues of race, ethnicity, abelism complicate this situation 
enormously.  On another register, the reception of soaps by working 
class women and by women in “third world,” as well as what were once 
one-party state communist countries, namely Russia, find American 
soap operas fanciful projections of life styles they could never hope 
to achieve. They read them as being “unrealistic,” confirming more 
what they don’t have than what they hope to have (Brown, 1990 a,b). 
Soviet capitalism fashioned a decade later has been conditioned and 
shaped by these very unattainable fantasies.  Joyrich (1988; 1990:162-63) 
is especially perceptive in her account of showing how the tropes of 
female proximity, fluidity, and “nearness” which are codes of “feminine 
textuality,” offered as subversive alternatives to masculine models 
of identity, support the psychology of the perfect consumer. And, as 
forcefully argued by Rosemary Hennessy (1993, 2000), this emergent 
“new woman” is the exemplar for the logic of late capitalism. 
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Concluding Thoughts
The dangers of resistant pleasure have been well voiced 
throughout cultural studies. It has been my thesis that such resistant 
pleasures enable capitalist consumerist ideology to reproduce itself. 
Cynical reason is one resistant response; the resistant repetition 
involved in the consumption of romance is yet another. Cathartic 
release through the media experiences of violence, melodrama, and 
erotica (pornography) purge the body of its pent up desires to change 
social conditions. In order for capitalist patriarchy to maintain its 
hegemony, seduction through fantasy formations must provide a broad 
enough range of subject positions to psychically satisfy and preserve 
the existent class, race, sex/gender, ethnic, age dynamics. The relation 
between fantasy and lived experience becomes the key site/sight/cite 
for counter-hegemonic intervention. For groups like ACT UP the fantasy 
formations of AIDS created by the media, the state, and the medical 
profession have been exposed (e.g., Crimp, 1988), consequently their 
resistance have been “antagonistic” rather than the complacent kind 
developed in this essay. For a more active form of resistance it seems 
that a return to a neo-Gramscian agenda of “popular education” is in 
order (Hall, 1996). Ang (1996) worries how feminist cultural workers 
might avoid the “moral high ground” when confronting the fantasies 
of their non-feminist informants. It seems to me that a visual cultural 
studies education that steers, or oscillates between the fantasy subject 
positions offered by any given text and an investigation of a personal 
psychic investment and commitment to specific fantasies by informants-
students-co-researchers and researcher or research team would be one 
possible way to level the moral ground (jagodzinski, 2002). Leaving 
ethnographic investigations at the level of discourse theories alone 
enables an abdication of social and ethical responsibility by all those 
concerned. If the context and the “already ready” historical discourses 
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determine the subject then the subject must continually reflect the 
guilt or makes excuses why the situation cannot be changed. Only by 
recognizing the impossible gap which exists between the enunciated 
subject and the subject of enunciation can responsibility be taken for 
the fantasies we identify with. Perhaps then, certain fantasies which 
prevent “freedom” towards more democratic social relations can be 
rejected and replaced by more enabling fantasies. But this may not be 
a pleasurable matter. 
Notes
1. McGowan (1991: 131-134) provides three succinct criticisms 
of Foucault´s theory of power which could be characteristic of cynical 
reason. First, freedom conceptualized as resistance is empty. ‘All power 
in Foucault is equal, just as all resistance is approved’ (132). Foucault 
never qualifies the resistance by questioning its goals. Second, freedom 
is exercised in resistance rather than in power. In other words, he has 
not an articulated sense of the positive sense of power—especially its 
capacity to achieve collective goals. Power has a ‘distinctly negative 
charge’ (133) which bifurcates his theory into power as conservative 
action against resistance as transgressive action. And third is Foucault´s 
difficulty identifying when ‘power is not an evil’ (134).
 2. Fiske (1987) dismissed the usefulness of psychoanalysis in 
his study of television, confining its possibilities to film alone. The 
Foucaultian decentered subject of discourse replaced the ‘split-subject’ 
of psychoanalysis in his approach to cultural studies. John Rajchman 
(1991) has usefully elaborated on the different understanding of the 
‘self’ between Lacan and Foucault by examining their respective ethical 
stances.
 3. In contrast to Althusser (1971), for instance, who conceives these 
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micro-politics of power as part of the Ideological State Apparatuses 
(ISA’s). The individual is ‘already ready’ interpellated by the ideological 
big Other (the state). 
 4. Here I follow Copjec’s (1994) critique of Foucault. The 
‘unknowable’ nature of the organizing principal of society is crucial 
here. Society as an ‘open system’ can still be usefully theorized by 
speculating on the cause which is occluded from the system but which 
nevertheless establishes the system in the first place. This first principal 
functions as a phantasy structure of ideology. According to Copjec, 
Foucault’s rejection of psychoanalysis places him as a ‘historicst’ who 
grounds being at the level of appearance and avoids any questions of 
desire (as fantasy) which is registered negatively (as absent) in language. 
‘[W]e are calling historicist the reduction of society to its indwelling 
newtwork of relations of power and knowledge’ (6).
 5. Benetton’s racist advertising has been well exposed and 
documented. See Giroux (1994); Back and Quaade (1994); Thévenaz 
(1995).
 6. Chaos theory is a science of process rather than state, of 
becoming rather than being. It incorporates the erratic and the irregular, 
discontinuity and disorder, oscillation and wild swirls into a science 
that searches for new laws that encompass these patterns so as to make 
a strong claim about the universal behavior of hypercomplex systems. 
Chaos means a special complex kind of prediction and probability 
assessment. Irregularity can now be analyzed now that powerful 
computers available (see Gleick, 1987).
 7 .Her 1986 study examined the pleasures of violence by working 
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class men. The fantasy provided a ‘romantic’ hope that they could get 
ahead in the world through physical struggle ‘with their hands’ alone. 
It becomes a specific masculine response to overcome humiliation and 
cowardice. In her 1993 study with June Melody she identifies how the 
fantasy formation of the ‘orphan child’ in the film Annie enables six 
year old Eliana to cope living with her dysfunctional family. Pleasure 
is found in Annie’s escape from her drunken mother and finding true 
happiness with a wealthy man. 
8. See Zizek (1991).
9. Fiske´s (1987:50-51) definition of jouissance as developed by 
Barthes goes as follows: ‘Jouissance, translated variously as bliss, ecstasy, 
or orgasm, is the pleasure of the body that occurs at the moment of the 
breakdown of culture into nature. It is a loss of self and of the subjectivity 
that controls and governs the self—the self is socially constructed and 
therefore controlled, it is the site of subjectivity and therefore the site of 
ideological production and reproduction. The loss of self is, therefore, 
the evasion of ideology. ... The orgasmic pleasure of the body out of 
control—the loss of self—is a pleasure of evasion, of escape from the 
self-control/social control ... an escape from meaning ...  .’ 
10. See Zizek (1989:68-69) for jouissance as theorized more as a 
question of plaisir. Fiske (1987:229-230) admits that ‘the distinction 
between plaisir and jouissance is often difficult to make in practice.…’
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